Creditor Democracy in Insolvency: Evaluating the Committee of Creditors under India's IBC in Comparative Perspective

insolvency law, creditor democracy, committee of creditors, corporate restructuring, comparative law, India IBC, bankruptcy governance

This research examines the Committee of Creditors (CoC) mechanism under India's Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) 2016, comparing it with creditor governance structures in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. The study analyzes the effectiveness of India's creditor democracy model in facilitating corporate restructuring and maximizing creditor value recovery. Through comparative legal analysis and empirical data from 2017-2024, this research evaluates voting mechanisms, creditor representation, and decision-making processes across jurisdictions. Findings reveal that India's 66% majority threshold and financial creditor dominance create unique governance dynamics distinct from debtor-in-possession models or court-supervised approaches. The study concludes that while India's CoC structure demonstrates innovation in creditor empowerment, challenges remain in balancing diverse creditor interests and ensuring efficient resolution timelines. The research contributes to understanding insolvency law reform and creditor governance mechanisms in emerging economies.