One Nation One Election and the Future of Indian Federalism: A Constitutional Analysis

One Nation One Election, Indian Federalism, Basic Structure Doctrine, Article 368, Anti-Defection Law, Kovind Committee, Simultaneous Elections, Constitutional Amendment, Legislative Sovereignty, Electoral Reform

The proposal for 'One Nation One Election' (ONOE) the synchronisation of Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assembly elections into a single, simultaneous electoral cycle has resurfaced as a centrepiece of constitutional debate in India. Endorsed by the High-Level Committee chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind in 2024 and introduced as twin constitutional amendment bills before Parliament, ONOE raises profound questions that transcend mere electoral logistics. This paper undertakes a comprehensive constitutional analysis of the ONOE proposal through the prism of Indian federalism. It examines the historical evolution of simultaneous elections, the constitutional provisions implicated, the structural tension between a unitary electoral calendar and the federal division of powers, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on basic structure doctrine as it applies to federalism, the position of State governments and regional parties, and comparative constitutional experiences from Germany, South Africa, Sweden, and the United States. The paper concludes that while ONOE is not per se unconstitutional, its implementation in the form currently proposed raises serious concerns about legislative sovereignty of States, the accountability function of elections, and the integrity of India's federal compact. Robust amendments to the Tenth Schedule, Article 172, Article 83, and supporting legislation are necessary prerequisites. ONOE is constitutionally achievable only if it strengthens rather than subordinates  the federal architecture of the Indian republic.